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NOTE
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION AND PERRY V. NEW
HAMPSHIRE: WHERE MAN'S FRAILTY DISAPPOINTS HIS
JUSTICE SYSTEM
CharityF. Stotmeistert
I. INTRODUCTION

For the individual defendant, the admission of an eyewitness
identification resulting from suggestive circumstances can be devastating.
Even if the suggestive circumstances of the identification were accidental,

no one wants an unreliable finger pointed at him from across the
courtroom. A great deal of empirical research over the last thirty years has
substantiated the dangers of admitting eyewitness testimony.
In Perry v. New Hampshire,2 the United States Supreme Court had its
first modern opportunity to address the eyewitness identification topic in
light of current needs. In this case, Barion Perry ("Perry") was identified by
a woman who claims she saw him from her apartment window.3 Perry
asserted that the circumstances surrounding the woman's identification
were suggestive of him as the perpetrator because Perry, the only black man
outside in the parking lot, was standing next to a police officer at the time
the woman identified him.' In his appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, Perry sought to have his Due Process argument heard even though
there was no state action-a prerequisite to a Due Process claim.'
Consequently, this case was the first of its kind because it involved a

t Managing Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 7. J.D. Candidate,
Liberty University School of Law (2013); B.A., summa cum laude, University of WisconsinPlatteville (2010). It is my Lord and Savior to whom I owe all that I have and have done. A
special thanks to the dedicated Liberty University Law Review staff for helping develop and
edit this Note-especially Kristal Dahlager; your guidance and support was invaluable.
Finally, I want to thank my dear family for all their prayers and encouragement-I am so
grateful to call you not just my family, but also my dearest friends. Indeed, "The lines are
fallen unto me in pleasant places,yea, I have a goodly heritage." Psalm 16:6.
1. See infra part IV.A.
2. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
3. Joint Appendix at 48a, 55a, 61a, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No.
10-8974).
4. Id. at 49a.
5. Id. at 4228a.
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suggestive circumstance that was not the result of any police or state
misconduct. Without state action, the Due Process Clause was not
implicated; therefore, the Court did not need to create a new standard to
resolve the current one.
This Note does not attempt to form a bright-line rule of decision on how
to handle suggestive eyewitness testimony. Instead, this Note asserts that
the best defense against the negative implications that can result from
suggestive eyewitness testimony is skilled attorney advocacy. An informed,
well-equipped defense attorney can and must properly attack the fallibilities
of eyewitness identification and present that information to the jury. In
addition, trial judges making admissibility determinations must be equally
informed on the fallibility of eyewitness identifications and make
admissibility determinations with that information in mind.
When a new rule is required to solve a problem, in addition to education
reform, there are essential, general principles that must be employed to
guide the lawmaker in any effort to bring about the law's evolution.
Although admitting suggestive eyewitness identification can be "unfair" in
one case, a new Due Process standard for all suggestive identifications-as
Perry asserted-may not be the best solution. What can be termed,
"subjective fairness judgments" undermine the law's very structure.
Although the law must evolve and adapt to current needs, this evolution
must be guided by adherence to the integrity of the law, its religious roots
and transcendent qualities, efficiency of adjudication, protection of
constitutional liberties, accountability, power in numbers, and, especially in
the criminal law sense, deterrence. These principles, although not explicitly
stated as such, have been the unspoken backbone of historical
accomplishments in the law and must guide its development in the modern
era as well.
Part II of this Note provides the background of eyewitness identification,
including the procedure for eyewitness identifications and the important
United States Supreme Court precedents. Part III recounts the facts and
procedural history of Perry v. New Hampshire. Part IV confronts the
problems associated with eyewitness identifications and their susceptibility
to error. Finally, Part V proposes a framework for courts to use to resolve
disputes involving not only eyewitness identifications but also when a court
is presented with an issue that, due to advances in technology or scientific
research, requires fresh analysis in light of those changes or advancements.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Eyewitness Identification
Although it has been around for centuries, the topic of eyewitness
identification is riddled with misconceptions. At the mention of this factfinding procedure, one's mind almost invariably runs through scenes from
television shows such as Perry Mason or Law & Order. A witness is sitting
on the stand; the prosecution asks her if the person she saw commit the
crime is in the courtroom; the witness says yes; the prosecution then asks
the witness if she will identify the accused; the witness lifts her arm and
sternly points to the defendant; a quiet gasp is heard across the courtroom
as everyone realizes that a conviction for the defendant is a practical
certainty. Despite common presuppositions, however, such in-court
identifications have little value and are done only for effect and to meet the
"technical requirements of the prosecution's case."' By the time a witness
makes an in-court identification, counsel for both parties are fully aware
that the witness has already identified the defendant during the police
investigation.!
Before a witness ever takes the stand, one of several pretrial identification
methods has already been employed.' Most identifications occur in "pretrial
confrontation[s]"' and fall under one of three categories: mug-shot
searches,' 0 showups, or lineups." In a pretrial confrontation," known as a
6. LAWRENCE TAYLOR, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 99 (Stephen R. Saltzburg & Kenneth

R. Redden eds., 1982).
7. Id.
8.

NATHAN R. SOBEL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 3

(Dee Pridgen ed., 2d ed. 2011).
9. Id. at 4.
10. Although mug-shots will not be discussed in this Note, see Hunter A. McAllister,
Mug Books: More Than Just Large Photospreads, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS
PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 35 (R.C.L. Lindsay et. al. eds., 2007) for a more in-depth

look at the interesting issues that surround this identification procedure. A mug-shot search
is when a witness looks through a book of mug shots to find a possible suspect. Id. This is
different from a photo array-where the police already have a suspect and include his picture
in the array-because in a mug-shot search the police do not already have a suspect. Id.
11. Jennifer E. Dysart & R.C.L. Lindsay, Show-up Identifications:Suggestive Technique or
Reliable Method?, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE,

supra note 10, at 137.
12. In this context, the term confrontation refers to the one-on-one nature of the
suspect's contact with the witness. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment refers
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"showup," a witness may identify a suspect after being presented with only
one person or photo." If the identification is in-person, the suspect is
brought alone-subject to accompaniment of police officers-to the
witness." If an in-person identification is not available or not preferable, a
showup occurs when a witness is given one photo of a suspect and is asked
if that is the perpetrator." As one could surmise, showups represent the
most suggestive identification procedure.'" The United States Supreme
Court stated that it could not conceive of a procedure that more strongly
represents the suggestion that the person presented "is believed guilty by the
police.""
In a "lineup," a witness chooses-or has the opportunity to choosefrom several suspects. The lineup can occur at the police station, where the
witness can choose from a number of suspects standing on a stage;" the
lineup can also occur with the use of a photo array.20 Less controversy
surrounds lineups than showups because, in a lineup, the witness is given a

generally to the trial itself, guaranteeing a criminal defendant's right to confront an accusing
witness face-to-face and to cross-examine that witness. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See Maryland
v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860 (1990) (holding that this right may be overridden if the witness is
especially vulnerable, as with a child who is an alleged victim of sexual abuse). Additionally,
even then, the defendant's attorney must have an opportunity to examine the witness while
the defendant observes by means of closed-circuit television or a similar device. Id. at 836,
857, 868.
13. Dysart & Lindsay, supra note 11.
14. SOBEL, supra note 8, at 5.
15. Dysart & Lindsay, supra note 11, at 137.
16. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 102-03.
17. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 234 (1967); see also United States v. Jones, 535
F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that a showup was suggestive where the defendant was
paraded in custody in front of bank windows); Jenkins v. Warrington, 530 F. Supp. 121, 125
(D. Mont. 1982) (referring to showups as a "questionable method of identification"), affd,
714 F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1983); Howard v. United States, 954 A.2d 415, 423 (D.C. 2008) (noting
that when defendant was handcuffed and illuminated by a police spotlight, "something more
egregious than mere custodial status is required to establish impermissible suggestivity .... "
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Massachusetts v. Phillips, 897 N.E.2d 31, 41 (Mass.
2008) ("One-on-one identifications are generally disfavored because they are viewed as
inherently suggestive." Nevertheless, "a one-on-one pretrial identification raises no due
process concerns unless it is determined to be unnecessarily suggestive." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
18. SOBEL, supra note 8, at 4-5.
19. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 101.
20. SOBEL, supra note 8, at 5.
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choice among a number of suspects.2 1 With alternative choices follows a
lesser likelihood of suggestiveness and, ultimately, a lesser likelihood of a
mistaken identification.22 As discussed below, these methods of
identification all concern procedures employed by the police. 23 Also, Part III
of this Note discusses the identification method, or lack thereof, employed
in Perry v. New Hampshire"-thespecific case this Note addresses.
All controversy surrounding these identifications involves their
admissibility. The key players involved in the criminal justice systemdefendants, judges, and lawyers alike-are concerned about admitting
potentially false or misleading evidence and presenting it to the jury. The
Sixth Amendment25 right to counsel and the Due Process Clause 2 6 are
constitutional provisions that govern the admissibility of police-arranged
identification procedures and in-court identifications.2 7 In the context of
eyewitness identifications, the Sixth Amendment requires that defendants
have a right to the presence of counsel during corporeal 28 identification
procedures conducted after the initiation of judicial proceedings. 29 The Due

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 94.
Id.
TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 100.
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
The Sixth Amendment provides,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
26. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
27. Ofer Raban, On Suggestive and Necessary Identification Procedures,37 AM. J.CRIM.
L. 53,53 (2009).
28. "Corporeal" is defined as "having a physical, material existence; tangible." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 368 (9th ed. 2009).
29. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 231 (1977) (noting that this is independent of any
right to counsel issue).
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Process Clause forbids the admission of identification testimony that
violates principles of fairness.30
In determining whether an eyewitness identification should be admitted,
a court must consider its suggestiveness. One scholar describes suggestive
identification this way:
A suggestive identification procedure is one that suggests to the
identifying witness who is the suspect expected to be identified.
Suggestiveness may take many forms: asking the witness to pay
particular attention to "number three" in a six-person lineup;
having the defendant as the only Hispanic in a photo array;
presenting numerous photographs with only the suspect
appearing in all of them; or.. .presenting only the suspect to the
witness, handcuffed and surrounded by police officers.31
Thus, the problems associated with eyewitness identification have more to
do with how the witness was asked to identify the suspect than the actual
identity of the person she saw.
B. Eyewitness Identificationand the Supreme Court: Then and Now
The modern development of the law regarding eyewitness identification
began in 1967. On June 12, 1967, the Supreme Court handed down the
decisions comprising the "landmark-trilogy" 2 of Wade-Gilbert-Stovall."
Scholars have noted that this was the first time the Court attempted to
establish constitutional safeguards regarding the admissibility of eyewitness
identification evidence in United States courts." Prior to these decisions,
this area of criminal procedure was largely neglected.35 Except in the limited
circumstance where an identification testimony was the result of an illegal
arrest, there was "no solid constitutional basis upon which [to base] an

30. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299 (1967), abrogated by Harper v. Va. Dep't of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993). See id. at 305 (Black, J., dissenting) ("The concept of due
process under which the Court purports to decide this question . .. is ... to determine in its
own judgment whether [the circumstances] comport with the Court's notions of decency,
fairness, and fundamental justice.").
31. Raban, supra note 27, at 54.
32. SOBEL, supra note 8, at 1.
33. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
34. See SOBEL, supra note 8, at 1.

35. Id.
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objection to the receipt of eyewitness identification testimony."3 6 Different
from the situation where a defendant's confession is obtained, "the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not afford a criminal
suspect a right of nonparticipation in identification procedures." 37 Before
1967, the rule of admissibility regarding identification was simple: courts
asked whether the confrontation "was so unnecessarily suggestive and
conducive to irreparable mistaken identification that [the suspect] was
denied due process of law.""
As a result of Wade, Gilbert,and Stovall, a type of exclusionary rule was
established." In Gilbert,the Court held that an identification resulting from
a lineup conducted outside the presence of counsel must be excluded.40 As
Wade noted, however, if the prosecution could demonstrate, by clear and
convincing evidence, that an in-court identification had a source
independent of the pretrial identification, such testimony would be
admissible." Further, in Stovall, the Court held that the standards of Wade
and Gilbert did not apply retroactively to lineups conducted before June 12,
1967, the day the three cases were decided.42
Despite Wade's bright-line rule establishing the right to counsel at
identification procedures, Kirby v. Illinoise3 modified it. In Kirby, the Court
held that the right to counsel rule explained in Wade applies only to lineups
taking place after the formal indictment." Later, in United States v. Ash,
the Court held that the right to counsel rule does not extend to
photographic identification procedures. 6 Moreover, the right to counsel
rule extends only when the corporeal lineup was held after the defendant
was formally charged. Even though Wade and Gilbert were influential, the
Stovall segment of the trilogy is the most significant. Stovall was the first
36. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
(West 2009).
37. Id.
38. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
39. See SOBEL, supra note 8, at 10.
40. Id. at 273.
41. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,240 (1967).
42. Id. at 300.
43. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
44. Id. at 690.
45. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
46. Id. at 321.

47. SOBEL, supra note 8, at 11.

PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION 343
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time the Court held that an unfair identification procedure would result in a
violation of due process. 8 Stovall set forth a general standard that "a
claimed violation of due process of law in the conduct of a confrontation
depends on the totality of the circumstances surrounding it."4 9
With the totality of the circumstances standard, courts could make
independent, factual evaluations to determine whether the facts of a
particular case established an unfair identification confrontation. Also, it is
important to note that exigency became an additional factor to consider; if
the situation is sufficiently urgent, then the totality of the circumstances
standard may be somewhat relaxed.so A year later, the Court in Simmons v.
United States" held that an identification should be excluded if it "give[s]
rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification."52 Judge
Friendly, in United States ex. rel. Phipps v. Follette,53 described the Simmons
framework this way:
[T]he required inquiry is two-pronged. The first question is
whether the initial identification procedure was "unnecessarily"
(Stovall) or "impermissibly" (Simmons) suggestive. If it is found
to have been so, the court must then proceed to the question
whether the procedure found to have been "unnecessarily" or
"impermissibly" suggestive was so "conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification" (Stovall) . . . that allowing the witness to

make an in-court identification would be a denial of due process.
The instruction that resolution of this issue "depends on the
totality of the circumstances" [Stovall], although probably as
good a start as could have been made, does not instruct very
much. .. . The effort must be to determine whether, before the
imprint arising from the unlawful identification procedure, there
was already such a definite image in the witness' mind that he is

48. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967); SOBEL, supra note 8, at 11.
49. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302 (emphasis added).
50. Id. In Stovall, the eyewitness was hospitalized and no one knew how long she would
live. Id. The police followed the only feasible procedure available-bringing the defendant to
the hospital so that the eyewitness could identify him. Id.
51. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
52. Id. at 384.
53. United States ex. rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1970).
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able to rely on it at trial without much, if any, assistance from its
successor. 54
Although this explanation is quite useful, no United States Supreme Court
case has, thus far, attempted to articulate what the required inquiry should
be.
Furthermore, in the seminal case Neil v. Biggers," the Court analyzed
whether the admission of an out-of-court showup identification would
violate a defendant's Due Process rights." The standard applied in Biggers
more closely aligns with the standard suggested by Judge Friendly. The
Biggers Court found that it must first look to external factors to analyze
whether an identification-though tainted by suggestive identification
procedures-is nevertheless "reliable.""
In making this decision, the Court outlined the following factors, to be
considered when evaluating the likelihood of misidentification:
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of
the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the
witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length
of time between the crime and the confrontation."
In using the Biggers factors, the Court seemingly shifted its inquiry to one
simply of reliability, rather than asking whether the police identification
procedure was "unnecessarily suggestive" and "conducive to irreparable
mistaken identification.""
The next major Supreme Court case concerning due process and
60
eyewitness identification was Manson v. Brathwaite.
In Brathwaite, the
Court was tasked with determining whether due process requires "the
exclusion, . . . apart from any consideration of reliability, of pretrial
identification evidence obtained by a police procedure that was both
suggestive and unnecessary."61 The Court applied the Biggers analysis,
noting that suggestive and unnecessary testimony may be admitted and,
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 914-15.
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
Id. at 190.
Id. at 199.
Id. at 199-200.
TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 164.
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
Id. at 99.
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thus, does not violate due process as long as the identification itself is
sufficiently reliable.62 The Brathwaite decision is particularly helpful
because it outlines the two post-Biggers approaches on the admissibility of
suggestive identifications. 6 ' The Court noted,
The first, or per se approach, employed by the Second Circuit ...
focuses on the procedures employed and requires exclusion of
the out-of-court identification evidence, without regard to
reliability, whenever it has been obtained through unnecessarily
suggested confrontation procedures. The justifications advanced
are the elimination of evidence of uncertain reliability,
deterrence of the police and prosecutors, and the stated fair
assurance against the awful risks of misidentification.
The second, or more lenient, approach is one that continues
to rely on the totality of the circumstances. It permits the
admission of the confrontation evidence if, despite the suggestive
aspect, the out-of-court identification possesses certain features
of reliability. Its adherents feel that the per se approach is not
mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This second approach, in contrast to the other, is
ad hoc and serves to limit the societal costs imposed by a
sanction that excludes relevant evidence from consideration and
evaluation by the trier of fact.'
Ultimately, the Court dispensed with the per se approach because it went
too far by automatically keeping from the jury evidence that may be both
reliable and relevant.65 Moreover, the Court concluded that "reliability is the
linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification." 66 The Court
then analyzed reliability by using the factors outlined in Biggers and
concluded that the post-Stovall identification evidence offered by the
prosecution in that case did not violate due process of law.
Although Brathwaiteis the last major Supreme Court case on eyewitness
identification as it relates to due process, more recent cases provide helpful
insights into this widely criticized area of American criminal procedure. In
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 106.
Id. at 110 (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 112.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 116-17.

2013]

PERRY V. NEW HAMPSHIRE

207

1986, the Court in Colorado v. Connelly68 held that police misconduct is a
prerequisite to a violation of due process.69 Later, in Dowling v. United
States, 70 the Court recognized that "[j]udges are not free, in defining 'due
process,' to impose on law enforcement officials [their] 'personal and
private notions' of fairness and to 'disregard the limits that bind judges in
their judicial function."'7 ' The Court further explained that judges "are to
determine only whether the action complained of . . . violates those

fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and
political institutions, and which define the community's sense of fair play
and decency." 72 The Court also held that, "[bjeyond the specific guarantees
enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited
operation."
III. PERRY V. NEW HAMPSHIRE: No DUE PROCESS VIOLATION ABSENT POLICE
MISCONDUCT

A. Evidence at the SuppressionHearing
On August 15, 2008, around 2:53 AM, the Nashua, New Hampshire
Police received a report that a black male was trying to break into vehicles
in the back parking lot of an apartment building at 70 1/2 West Hollis
Street." Officer Nicole Clay was sent to the apartment building to
investigate." When she arrived at the multi-story apartment building, she
parked her marked cruiser out front and walked around the building.76
Officer Clay noted that there were twelve to fifteen cars in the parking lot,
which was "fairly well lit" with lights in the parking lot, lights on the back of
the building, and streetlights on Ash Street.77

68. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
69. Id. at 164. The Court also noted, "The most outrageous behavior by a private party
seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible
under the Due Process Clause." Id. at 166.
70. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
71. Id. at 353 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 170 (1952)).
72. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
73. Id. at 352.
74. Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 36a-37a.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 37a-38a, 42a.
77. Id. at 56a. Ash Street was the street at the exit to the parking lot. Id. at 178a.
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Once she arrived at the parking lot, Officer Clay heard a clang, as if a
metal bat had hit the ground, and saw the defendant, Barion Perry, a black
male, standing between the two vehicles." Perry then walked toward her
carrying two audio amplifiers." Officer Clay asked Perry to put the
amplifiers down and come speak to her.o Perry walked over to Officer Clay
and told her he found the amplifiers on the ground and that he was just
moving them." When asked where the amplifiers came from, Perry replied
that he saw two "kids" leaving the parking lot.8 2 Perry said that one of the
kids wore a white T-shirt and the other should be on Ash Street.83
Following Perry's description, Officer Clay and Perry walked to Ash
Street where Perry pointed out a man as one of the kids who left the parking
lot." Officer Clay approached the man, Rowley Anzani." Anzani told
Officer Clay that he had been in the house all night, that he had just come
outside to do something for his mother, that his friend had left half an hour
earlier, and that he had not seen anyone else on Ash Street in the last ten
minutes." While Officer Clay was talking to Anzani, Perry frequently
interjected that "he had just found the amplifiers and that other kids had
stolen them.""
Once Officer Clay and Perry returned to the parking lot, Alex Clavijo
came up to them and said that his neighbor witnessed someone breaking
into Clavijo's car parked in the parking lot." Clavijo also said that two
amplifiers and a large wooden box with two speakers mounted inside had
been taken from his car, which matched the description of the items Perry
had been carrying." By this time, Officer Robert Dunn, a white male," had
arrived at the parking lot." Officer Clay asked Perry to wait in the parking
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 37a.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39a.
Id. at 39a.
Id. at 40a.
Id. at 40a-41a
Id.
Id. at 41a.
Id.
Id. at 42a.
Id. at 70a-74a.
Id. at 65a-66a.
Id. at 43a.
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lot with Officer Dunn and then followed Clavijo into the apartment
building to speak with Mr. Clavijo's neighbor, Nubia Blandon.92 While he
waited, Perry stood talking to Officer Dunn; he was not handcuffed or
otherwise restrained.9 3
Once inside the apartment building, Clavijo escorted Officer Clay to the
second or third floor where they spoke in the hallway with Blandon.94
Blandon stated that, from her apartment window, she had seen a tall, black
male carrying a baseball bat, looking inside all the vehicles in the parking
lot.95 According to Blandon, the person circled Clavijo's car, opened the
trunk, and removed a large item.96 When asked for a more specific
description of what the man looked like, Blandon said that he was the man
that was standing in the parking lot with the police officer.97 As they spoke,
Blandon "pointed towards the window to show [Officer Clay] that she had
already looked out the window to see [Perry] and Officer Dunn standing in
the parking lot."" Although Officer Clay did not ask Blandon how long she
had been watching from the window, it would have taken a few minutes for
Perry to perform all of the actions that Blandon described.9 9 Thus, Blandon
must have watched Perry for some time to be able to describe, in detail, all
the actions she claimed she saw Perry doing.
Although the record is unclear as to the exact time, Blandon's husband,
Joffre Ullon, who had gone out to get coffee some time before Blandon saw
anything, returned home;' 0 Ullon was the first one to see "the perpetrator"
and was the one who called the police to report a man trying to break into
cars.' 0' In his conversation with Officer Clay, Ullon said "he saw a black
92. Id. at 44a.
93. Id. at 40a, 43a, 49a, 57a-58a, 65a.
94. Id. at 42a-44a, 48a, 66a.
95. Id. at 48a, 55a, 61a.
96. Id. The large item was a pine box containing audio speakers. Id. at 70a.
97. Id. at 48a.
98. Id. at 49a.
99. Id. at 62a-63a. Note that this information-whether Blandon stepped away from the
window or if she watched Perry all the way up until the time Officer Clay spoke to himwould have been instrumental in the theft investigation. If Blandon was standing at the
window watching the perpetrator in the parking lot and kept watching that person all the
time until Officer Clay walked up to him, this author believes that this case would have been
settled before trial. Instead, Officer Clay did not ask Blandon any questions about what she
was doing as she watched the events in the parking lot or how long she was there.
100. Id. at 50a, 54a.
101. Id. at 80a-81a, 40a-41a; see also id. at 54a.
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male walking through the parking lot and lifting up on the [car] door
handles."10 2 When Officer Clay asked for a description of the man, Ullon
said it was the man who was standing in the parking lot with the police
officer.' After Officer Clay finished speaking with Blandon and Ullon, she
went back to the parking lot where she saw Perry and Officer Dunn
standing about thirty feet away, at the end of the lot, where it was not as well
lit.' Officer Clay then found Clavijo's wooden box and speakers in the
lot' and arrested Perry.'0 6
B. FurtherEvidence at Trial
At trial, Blandon testified that she watched Perry from her kitchen
window for about half an hour before Officer Clay arrived.o' Blandon
testified that, when she saw Officer Clay arrive, she left the window and
went across the hall to Clavijo's apartment to tell him that he was being
robbed.' While Blandon watched out the window, Ullon went downstairs,
on his way out to get coffee,'09 and as he was driving out of the parking lot
he saw Perry walking around the cars parked in the apartment lot."0 Just as
he was driving out of the parking lot, Ullon saw a bicycle near the exit and
saw Perry standing nearby in a well-lit area."' Ullon, however, could not see
Perry's face because it appeared to him that Perry intentionally turned his
face away from Ullon." 2 Ullon chose to drive back through the parking lot
via the front entrance to get a better look, but Perry crouched behind some
cars."' After leaving the complex to get coffee, Ullon returned to the lot
and, as he was parking his car, he saw Perry standing with Officer Dunn.
Then Ullon went up to his and Blandon's apartment and spoke with Officer

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 54a.
Id. at 55a.
Id. at 57a, 58a.
Id. at 74a.
Id. at 84a.
Id. at 216a-17a.
Id. at 216a-18a.
Id. at 54a, 56a, 212a, 228a-29a, 238a-39a.
Id. at 216, 238a-39a.
Id. at 238a, 247a.
Id. at 238a.
Id. at 238a-39a.
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Clay."' Over a month later, on September 21, 2008, the Nashua Police
interviewed Blandon."' The police gave her a photo array, which included a
picture of Perry."' When asked to point out the man she saw in the parking
lot in August, Blandon was unable to make an identification."'
C. ProceduralBackground of Perry v. New Hampshire
On February 18, 2009, prior to trial, Perry moved to suppress Blandon's
out-of-court identification pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the state
and federal constitutions."' In his motion to suppress, Perry first argued
that the identification procedure was "unnecessarily suggestive" because
Blandon identified Perry only after she saw the police car and Perry being
arrested and handcuffed."' Second, Perry argued that Blandon's
identification was unreliable and asked the court to exclude the
identification under Neil v. Biggers.'20 In the State's objection to Perry's
motion to suppress, it argued first that no Due Process analysis was
required because Blandon's identification was not the result of police
action. 2 ' Second, the State argued that the circumstances'22 of the
identification demonstrate its reliability.12 3

114. Id. at 196a, 241a.
115. Id. at 286a.
116. Id. at 59a-60a.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 12a-17a (citing U.S. CoNsT. amends. V, XIV; N.H. CONsT. pt. I, art. 15). This is
the identification Blandon made from her apartment, where she told Officer Clay that the
man she saw walking around the cars was the same man who was standing next to Officer
Dunn in the parking lot. Id. At the hearing, Perry's counsel clarified that Perry was not
moving to exclude Ullon's identification. Id. at 51a-53a.
Before the New Hampshire Supreme Court granted Perry's appeal, his counsel,
Melissa A. Kowalewski, filed a motion to withdraw and new counsel was appointed on
appeal. Id. at 6a. The court granted the motion and Richard Guerriero, a Concord,
Connecticut Public Defender, was appointed as new counsel. Id. In oral argument at the
United States Supreme Court, Justice Ginsberg asked Guerriero to distinguish Blandon's
testimony from Ullon's testimony and asked why he did not move to suppress Ullon's
testimony. Transcript of Oral Argument at 14-15, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716
(2012) (No. 10-8974). Guerriero responded, "Trial counsel simply did not move to suppress
that testimony. I don't have a good explanation, and, to be frank, I would have filed the
motion to suppress his testimony." Id.
119. Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 15a-16a.
120. Id. at 12a-16a.
121. Id. at 24a.
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At the hearing for the motion to suppress, Perry further argued that there
was sufficient state action present to warrant a Due Process analysis.'24 In
contrast, the State argued that there was no unnecessarily suggestive state
action because the police neither knew that Blandon was watching Perry,
nor did anything to suggest that they wanted her to identify Perry.' 25 The
Hillsborough County Superior Court for the Southern Judicial District
ruled that because "Blandon's identification of [Perry] was not derived from
any suggestive technique employed by the police," 26 the court did "[not
need to] consider whether the identification was otherwise reliable." 27
At trial, defense counsel said in her opening statement that the case was
"about the wrong identification, an inaccurate identification." 28 During her
testimony, the defense extensively cross-examined Blandon-counsel asked
her about watching a person in the parking lot from a window on the fourth
floor, her view being partially blocked by a van,129 her inability to describe
the color of the bicycle the person was riding,'30 her inability to describe the
person's clothing or facial features, 3' and her inability to pick the petitioner

122. The circumstances demonstrating reliability, according to the State were:
First, Ms. Blandon had an excellent opportunity to view the defendant....
Second, Ms. Blandon's degree of attention is evidenced by her description of
the events as they occurred, the gender and race of the defendant, the fact that
he was carrying a bat which was found at the scene, and that he removed a large
object from the victim's car, which proved to be accurate. . . . Third, the preidentification description of the defendant provided by Ms. Blandon was very
accurate. . .. Fourth, Ms. Blandon identified the defendant with certainty, as
she immediately identified him as the one in the back of the parking lot
standing with the officer. . . . Finally, the identification occurred only a matter
of minutes after the occurrence of the crime in question.
Id. at 27a-28a.
123. Id. at 27a-29a.
124. Id. at 76a-78a.

125. Id.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 86a.
Id. at 87a.
Id. at 113a.
Id. at 225a-26a.
Id. at 233a.
Id. at 233a-34a.
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out of a lineup. 13 2 Despite the defense's attempt to impeach Blandon, the
court admitted her out-of-court identification.133
Furthermore, the court also admitted Ullon's out-of-court identification
without objection from the defense. 13 4 In her closing argument, defense
counsel argued that the defendant was being tried only because there was
"an incomplete investigation" and "a wrong ID"35 and that Ullon and
Blandon's out-of-court identifications were unreliable and came about only
after the police provided them with "powerful" context clues.'36 After
approximately two hours of deliberation, the jury found the defendant
guilty of theft by unauthorized taking and not guilty of criminal mischief.'3 1
On August 17, 2009, Perry appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme
Court."' In his brief to the Court, Perry argued for the first time, in his case
and in the history of Due Process claims, that no state action was required
to trigger a Due Process analysis.' 9 The New Hampshire Supreme Court
did not address the State's preservation, reliability, and harmless error
arguments.'4 0 Instead, it "decline[d] to adopt the First Circuit's reasoning
that a Biggers analysis is required in all 'suggestive identification
procedures,"' and held "'that the Biggers analysis does not apply to a
potentially suggestive out-of-court identification where there is a complete
absence of improper state action..""4 1 The court further held that "[b]ecause
the evidence support[ed] the trial court's finding that [Perry] failed to carry
132. Id. at 234a-35a.
133. Id. at 173a-74a. Blandon was not asked to make an in-court identification of Perry.
Id.
134. Id. at 242a-43a, 245a-46a, 285a-87a.
135. Id. at 373a-74a.
136. Id. at 374a-75a. The context clues that defense counsel was referring to were the
facts that Ullon made the identification after he came back to the apartment complex and
that Ullon saw Perry talking to police officers while in custody. Id. at 374a. "Think about it,"
she said, "[p]olice officers dressed in uniforms driving cruisers, carrying guns." Id. Counsel
went on to add, "What's to say that he didn't think to himself at that point, well, thatthey're talking to him, it must have been him? What is to say that at that point he didn't
make that determination?" Id.
137. Id. at 408a-09a. The criminal mischief charge was brought as a result of breaking
Clavijo's car window.
138. Id. at 3a. Note that there is no intermediate appellate court in the State of New
Hampshire. Appeals from the trial level are made to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.
139. Id. at 428a.
140. Id.at9a-11a.
141. Id. at 10a (quoting State v. Addison, 8 A.3d 118, 125 (N.H. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.
Ct. 2444 (2011)).
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his burden of proof on the first step of the Biggers analysis"-improper state
action-"[it] need not consider the second step"-reliability.142 On May 31,
2011, the United States Supreme Court granted Perry's petition for
certiorari.14 3
D. Opinion of the United States Supreme Court
On January 11, 2012, the United States Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Ginsburg, evinced both its ability to sift through its own
eyewitness identification jurisprudence and its faith in the procedural and
constitutional safeguards that exist in the United States justice system.
Despite Justice Sotomayor's dissent, the Court held that "[tihe fallibility of
eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of improper state conduct,
warranta due process rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for
reliability before allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness." 44 The
Court denied the chance to "enlarge the domain of due process,"
recognizing that "the jury, not the judge, traditionally determines the
reliability of evidence."145
1. Majority Opinion
If the purpose of the introduction of a judicial opinion is to set the tone
for the decision, Justice Ginsburg demonstrated a fulfillment of that
46
From the
purpose in the first three sentences of Perry v. New Hampshire.1
beginning, the Court noted that not only does our justice system employ a
number of procedural and constitutional safeguards against injustice, but
this system also has the benefit of up to twelve unbiased additional
safeguards-the members of the jury.' In addition, the Court recognized
that it has placed an additional Due Process check on the admission of
eyewitness testimony "when the police have arranged suggestive
circumstances leading the witness to identify a particular person as the
perpetrator of a crime."' Even if an identification is "infected by improper

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
jury to
148.

Id. at 10a-11a.
Perry v. New Hampshire, 131 S. Ct. 2932 (2011) (mem.)
Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 720.
Id. ("[Tihe reliability of relevant testimony typically falls within the province of the
determine.").
Id.
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police influence," it is not per se excluded.'4 9 It is up to the trial judge to
conduct a pretrial screening of the evidence for reliability.so Thus, the
Court recognized that it has "not extended pretrial screening for reliability
to cases in which the suggestive circumstances were not arranged by law
enforcement officers.""' The touchstone of the Court's analysis "turn[s] on
the presence of state action and aim[s] to deter police from rigging
identification procedures."152
After analyzing the facts at issue in this case and the events at the state
court level, the Court explained that certiorari was granted to resolve a split
of opinion among the Circuit Courts of Appeal-whether "the Due Process
Clause requires the trial judge to conduct a preliminary assessment of the
reliability of an eyewitness identification made under suggestive
circumstances not arranged by the police.""' With deterrence in mind, the
Court went on to explain the Supreme Court's eyewitness identification
jurisprudence while at the same time rebutting Perry's contentions
regarding the applicability and rationale of certain cases.' Carrying the day
in the Court's analysis was the fact that, unlike Perry's case, every case in the
"Stovall line" of cases concerns law enforcement arranging the suggestive
circumstances. 5 5
Although Perry conceded that his case did not involve police
misconduct, he relied on the Court's concern in Brathwaite that the Due
Process Clause requires a pretrial screening of eyewitness identification."'
The Court noted that Perry's reliance on the statement in Brathwaite that
"reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification
testimony" was unfounded in light of the context in which that statement
was made.' The Court explained that "the BraithwaiteCourt's reference to
149. Id.
150. Id. The Court noted that "[i]f there is a 'very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification,' the judge must disallow presentation of the evidence at trial." Id. (quoting
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)).
151. Id. at 720-21.
152. Id. at 721.
153. Id. at 723. See id. n.4.
154. See id. at 724-28; see also pp. 197-205 (discussing the background of this area).
155. Id. at 725. The Stovall line of cases includes Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967);
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968); Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969);
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972); and Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
156. Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 428a.
157. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 725-26.
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reliability appears in a portion of the opinion concerning the appropriate
remedy when the police use an unnecessarily suggestive identification
procedure.""' Because deterrence of police misconduct is the purpose
underlying the exclusion of eyewitness evidence, the Court believed that
exclusion in Perry's case was "inapposite." 15 9
Moreover, because there was no police misconduct in Perry's case,
exclusion of Blandon's testimony would not serve a deterrent purpose. To
require a particular pretrial assessment of eyewitness testimony would
"entail a vast enlargement of the reach of due process as a constraint on the
admission of evidence."1" Although the Court recognized the fallible nature
of eyewitness testimony, it explained that "the potential unreliability of a
type of evidence does not alone render its introduction at the defendant's
trial fundamentally unfair."l61
Furthermore, the Court addressed not only procedural and
constitutional safeguards in general but specifically outlined the safeguards
that were employed in Perry's case.' 62 Thus, "[g]iven the safeguards
generally applicable in criminal trials, [and the] protections availed of by
the defense in Perry's case," the Court held "that the introduction of
Blandon's eyewitness testimony, without a preliminary judicial assessment
of its reliability, did not render Perry's trial fundamentally unfair."l63 With
no convincing reason to alter precedent, the Court held that "the Due
Process Clause does not require a preliminary judicial inquiry into the
reliability of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not
procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law
enforcement."'
2. The Concurrence: Justice Thomas
In a very brief concurring opinion, Justice Thomas expressed his
disagreement with the majority's application of the Stovall line of cases to

158. Id.
159. Id. at 726.
160. Id. at 727.
161. Id. at 728.
162. Id. at 728-30. The safeguards employed in Perry's case were these: Perry's counsel
cautioned the jury about the vulnerability of Blandon's testimony, counsel constantly
reminded the jury of those weaknesses, and the trial court instructed the jury addressing
eyewitness testimony and factors it should consider in evaluating it. Id. at 729.
163. Id. at 730.
164. Id.
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Perry.' 5 According to Justice Thomas, the cases comprising the Stovall line
were wrongly decided because these cases were based on a substantive due
process right to fundamental fairness. 16 6 Justice Thomas notes,"[T]he
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is not a 'secret repository of
substantive guarantees against unfairness."" 7 Thus, Justice Thomas would
"limit the Court's suggestive eyewitness identification cases to the precise
circumstances that they involved."'6 To put it simply, according to Justice
Thomas, the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees only process-it cannot be
used as a means to define the substanceof life, liberty, or property.
3.

The Dissent: Justice Sotomayor

In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor stated that the majority's decision
"effectively grafts a mens rea inquiry onto [the] rule" that the due process
concern should "arise[] not from the act of suggestion, but rather from the
corrosive effects of suggestion on the reliability of the resulting
identification." 69 Justice Sotomayor warned that the majority's state action
requirement suggests a distinction between intentional and unintentional
suggestion.'
Unintentional suggestion would result in admission;
intentional suggestion could result in exclusion."' Instead, Justice
Sotomayor advocated for the following inquiry:
First, the defendant has the burden of showing that the
eyewitness identification was derived through "impermissibly
suggestive" means. Second, if the defendant meets that burden,
courts consider whether the identification was reliable under the
totality of the circumstances. That step entails considering the
witness' opportunity to view the perpetrator, degree of attention,
accuracy of description, level of certainty, and the time between

165. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
166. Id.
167. Id. (citing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598-99 (1996)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)).
168. Id. See John F. Basiak, Jr., The Roberts Court and the Future of Substantive Due
Process: The Demise of "Split-the-Difference" Jurisprudence?,28 WHITTIER L. REV. 861, 889
(2007), for more information on Justice Thomas's views regarding substantive due process.
169. Perry,132 S. Ct. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
170. Id.
171. See id. at 735.
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the crime and pretrial confrontation, then weighing such factors
against the "corrupting effect of the suggestive identification."17 2
According to Justice Sotomayor, this inquiry would provide a "more
holistic conception of the dangers of suggestion."'7 ' The problem with the
dissent, however, is that Justice Sotomayor wholly misinterprets the
majority's analysis. Justice Sotomayor disagrees with the majority because it
created a "novel and significant limitation on our longstanding rule:
Eyewitness identifications so impermissibly suggestive that they pose a very
substantial likelihood of an unreliable identification will be deemed
inadmissible at trial only if the suggestive circumstances were 'policearranged." 74 Indeed, the Court used the "suggestive circumstances . . .
arranged by law enforcement officers" language, but it made clear that its
"decisions ... turn on the presence ofstate action."7 5
Contrary to what Justice Sotomayor would argue, the proper inquiry
does not question the police officer's mens rea-whether or not the officer
intentionally suggested to the witness that "this is the guy"-but instead
involves determining whether the state arranged for the identification
procedure. In Perry's case, the police did not arrange for an identification
when Blandon identified Perry. While Perry was in the parking lot, away
from the witness, the officer simply asked Blandon if she could describe the
person she saw trying to break into the cars.' In response, Blandon pointed
towards the window and said the man she saw was the man standing out in
the parking lot next to the other officer.' If, however, Officer Clay had
asked Blandon to look through the window at the man standing next to
Officer Dunn and asked her if the man next to Officer Dunn was the man
she saw trying to break into the cars, that would have been a policearranged identification. Although only suggestive eyewitness identifications
are subject to scrutiny, whether the Fourteenth Amendment is implicated at
all turns on whether the state arranged the identification, not whether the
state intended to create a suggestive identification.
To further express her dismay with the majority's decision, Justice
Sotomayor emphasized the inherent problems surrounding eyewitness
172.
(1977);
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 733 (footnote omitted) (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 108, 114
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)).
Id. at 739-40.
Id. at 733.
Id. at 721 (emphasis added).
Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 173a.
Id.
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identification and its propensity to generate wrongful convictions.' She
conceded that the identification in Perry most likely did not involve a
violation of due process."' 9 The reason for her dissent, however, was to
express her disappointment that the New Hampshire Supreme Court never
made any findings regarding due process "and, under the majority's
decision.. . never will." 80
IV. THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION

A. EmpiricalEvidence SurroundingEyewitness Identification
Although the jury often gives it considerable weight in a criminal trial,'
eyewitness identifications are surrounded by controversy. Even as far back
as 1932, a "survey suggested that among sixty-five cases in which innocent
persons were convicted, twenty-nine of the improper verdicts were
attributed to improper eyewitness identification."'8 2 That is more that fortyfour percent. Additionally, a more recent study estimates that fifty-two
percent of the wrongful conviction cases surveyed involved eyewitness
identifications.'8 3 In a study on exonerations in the United States from 1989
to 2003, it was found that "' [t]he most common cause of wrongful
convictions is eyewitness misidentification;' sixty-four percent of the
wrongful convictions identified involved an eyewitness misidentification,
including ninety percent of the rape cases in which the convicted defendant
was subsequently exonerated.""

178. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 738 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("The empirical evidence
demonstrates that eyewitness misidentification is 'the single greatest cause of wrongful
convictions in this country.'" (quoting State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 231 (2011))).
179. Id. at 739.
180. Id.
181. One study showed "that witnesses who make eyewitness identifications are believed
by jurors approximately eighty percent of the time, regardless of the accuracy of the
identifications." JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 562 (Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 4th ed. 2006) (citing Gary L. Wells, Effects of
Expert PsychologicalAdvice on Human Performance in Judging the Validity of Eyewitness
Testimony, 4 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 275,278 (1980)).
182. Id. at 559 (citing EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 3-5 (1932)).

183. Id. (citing Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the
CriminalJustice System, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283,289 (1988)).
184. Id. at 560 (citing Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989
through 2003, 95 J.CRiM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY 523,542 (2005)).
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Most misidentifications occur in one of two scenarios: intentional use of
suggestive techniques by police officers" or, as is most often the case, the
"inherent unreliability of human perception and memory and .

.

. human

susceptibility to unintentional, and often quite subtle, suggestive
influences.""' Studies show that "a person can simultaneously perceive only
a limited number of stimuli from his environment, even if his attention
level is high.""
With the considerable amount of concern surrounding eyewitness
identification, much effort has been made to understand the causes of
misidentification. A hornbook on criminal procedure explains the causes
this way:
Identification testimony has at least three components. First,
witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves
perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness
must memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must be
able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of
unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three
stages of the identification process, for whenever people attempt
to acquire, retain and retrieve information accurately they are
limited by normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences.
Perception is a highly selective process in which details later
shown to be important can be missed, and perceptual
inaccuracies are often caused by the brain's inherent limitations,
the circumstances of the observation, plus anxiety and fear.
Memory is constantly undergoing change; some details are
forgotten while others are added or altered to resolve the
cognitive dissonance that arises when new information differs
from the original memory representation. Recall is another
source of errors, for a narrative description unprompted by
questions results in incomplete information retrieval, while

185. See supra text accompanying notes 8-24.
186. Frederic D. Woocher, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REv. 969, 970 (1977).
For a dramatic example of the problems associated with misidentification, see DRESSLER &
MICHAELS, supra note 181, at 559-60 n.4 (citing Mark Hansen, Forensic Science: Scoping Out
Eyewitness Ids, 87 A.B.A. J.39, 39 (2001)).
187. DRESSLER &MICHAELS, supra note 181, at 561.
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structured questioning undertaken to achieve completeness
causes responses to become more inaccurate."
B. Specific Variables Affecting Identification Accuracy
In a recent, potentially landmark decision, the New Jersey Supreme
Court, in State v. Henderson,89 went to extensive lengths to reevaluate the
Manson v. Brathwaite decision and eyewitness identification in general. In
that case, the court appointed a Special Master to "evaluate scientific and
other evidence about eyewitness identifications."'" The Special Master
conducted a hearing and heard testimony from seven experts, comprising
2,000 pages of transcript. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Special
Master issued a report, which the New Jersey Supreme Court essentially
followed in its final opinion.' 9 ' The court found that there are a number of
variables that affect memory and can lead to misidentifications.19 2
These variables fit into two categories: system variables'93 and estimator
variables.' The system variables-variables within the State's control-that
the court noted and made recommendations about included: blind
administration, pre-identification procedures, lineup construction, avoiding
feedback and recording confidence, multiple viewings, simultaneous versus
sequential lineups, composites, and showups.'" Estimator variables

188. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 36, at 342.
189. State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011). In Henderson, the Petitioner was convicted
following a photographic array identification alleged to be impermissibly suggestive. Id. at
226-27. Initially, the witness could not make an identification. Id. at 223. A few minutes
later, two officers came into the questioning room and "just told him to focus, to calm down,
to relax and that any type of protection that [he] would need, any threats against [him]
would be put to rest by the Police Department." Ruiz added, "just do what you have to do,
and we'll be out of here." Id. at 224. The witness replied that he would make an
identification. Id. The witness identified the Petitioner seconds later. Id.
190. Henderson, 208 N.J. at 217.
191. Id.at217.
192. Id. at 247.
193. "System variables are factors like lineup procedures which are within the control of
the criminal justice system." Id. (citing Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony
Research: System Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
1546, 1546 (1978)).
194. "Estimator variables are factors related to the witness, the perpetrator, or the event
itself-like distance, lighting, or stress-over which the legal system has no control." Id.
195. Id. at 248-59. The system variables, under the control of the state, deal almost
exclusively with how the state (the police) should conduct lineup procedures. Although this
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included: stress, weapon focus, duration, witness characteristics,
characteristics of the perpetrator, memory decay, race-bias, private actors,
and speed of identification. 6
To aid in understanding the many variables associated with eyewitness
identification, the following paragraphs will briefly discuss the estimator
variables outlined by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Henderson.
In Henderson, the court employed a number of highly qualified and
experienced experts and compiled a significant amount of legal research on
the topic. Thus, the findings are quite comprehensive. The following
paragraphs will follow the order applied by the Henderson court in
evaluating the estimator variables.
1. Stress
Although high stress levels can increase a person's receptive faculties,
high levels of stress nevertheless are more likely to impair an identification
than low stress.'" In one study, researchers found that there was a thirtytwo percent decrease in identification accuracy when the witness was
subject to high stress at the time of interaction with the perpetrator.198
Although the court recognized that there is not a precise measure for what
constitutes "high" stress, it concluded, "[High levels of stress are likely to
affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications." 99
2. Weapon Focus
Weapon focus occurs when, as one would assume, a witness encounters
an individual with a weapon, and the witness is distracted by the weapon.2 00
This distraction draws the witness's focus away from the characteristics of
the culprit and onto the knife, gun, or other weapon.20' Although research
does not demonstrate that weapon focus has a grave effect on identification
accuracy, any number is significant when it concerns a wrongful
analysis is helpful in understanding the many aspects that play into eyewitness
identifications, they are not particularly relevant here because Perry did not involve a statearranged identification.
196. Id. at 261-71.
197. Id. at 261.
198. Id. at 262 (citing Charles A. Morgan III et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for
PersonsEncountered DuringExposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 265
(2004)).
199. Id. at 262.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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conviction.202 On average, accuracy decreases about ten percent when the
culprit has a weapon.2 03 In one experiment, misidentification increased by
thirty-one percent when the culprit was holding a syringe in a threatening
way towards the witness.2*
3.

Duration

As one would likely assume, the amount of time the witness observes the
culprit affects the reliability of the witness's identification. 205 Although there
is no magic number that marks the amount of time necessary to increase
accuracy, "brief or fleeting contact is less likely to produce an accurate
identification than a more prolonged exposure." 20 6 In addition, witnesses
consistently overestimate the amount of time that goes by during an
encounter.2 07
4.

Distance and Lighting

Although this variable is fairly obvious, distance and lighting can be a
major factor in the reliability of an identification.208 As the court recognized,
"[P]oor lighting makes it harder to see well. Thus, greater distance between
a witness and a perpetrator and poor lighting conditions can diminish the
reliability of an identification."209
5.

Witness Characteristics

Two witness characteristics that can have the greatest effect on
identification reliability are the witness's age and level of intoxication. Some
research indicates that witness accuracy decreases with age.2" 0 Witnesses
from the age of nineteen to twenty-four were more accurate than those

202. Id. at 263.

203. Id. (citing Nancy M. Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 413,415-17 (1992)).
204. Id. (citing Anne Maass & Gunther Koehnken, Eyewitness Identification: Simulating
the "Weapon Effect," 13 LAW &HUM. BEHAV. 397, 401-02 (1989)).
205. Id. at 264.

206. Id. (citing Colin G. Tredoux et al., Eyewitness Identification, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 875, 877 (Charles Spielberger ed., 2004)).
207. Id. (citing Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Time Went by So Slowly: Overestimation of Event
Durationby Males and Females, 1 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 3, 10 (1987)).
208. Id. at 264.
209. Id.
210.

Id. at 265.
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ranging from sixty-eight to seventy-four years old. 2 11 Researchers also
noticed what is termed, "own-age bias," which occurs when a witness is
better at recognizing people of her own age than people of other ages.2 12
Due to more nuanced research on this topic, the court could not make a
definitive judgment as to whether a jury instruction on the reliability of
older eyewitnesses would be appropriate.2 13
6.

Characteristics of the Perpetrator

A number of issues come into play concerning the characteristics of a
perpetrator. Disguises like hats, sunglasses, masks, and facial hair can all
reduce identification accuracy. 214
7. Memory Decay
Delay in the identification process can significantly affect identification
accuracy. As the court noted, "[T]he more time that passes, the greater the
possibility that a witness's memory of a perpetrator will weaken." 215 One
researcher found that there was a significant increase in identification
accuracy when identifications occur from two to twenty-four hours after an
event. 216
8. Race-Bias
Race-Bias is demonstrated most identifiably when a cross-racial
identification occurs-the eyewitness and the culprit are of different
races. 217 One study showed that European subjects were more reliable in
recognizing white than African faces, and vice versa. 218 The court in

211. Id. (citing James C. Bartlett & Amina Memon, Eyewitness Memory in Young and
Older Adults, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY: MEMORY FOR PEOPLE 317-19
(R.C.L. Lindsay et al., eds. 2007)).
212. Id. at 265-66.
213. Id. at 266.
214. Id. (citing Brian L. Cutler et al., Improving the Reliability of Eyewitness Identification:
PuttingContext into Context, 72 J.APPLIED PSYCHOL. 629, 635 (1987)).
215. Id. at 267.
216. Id. (citing Carol Krafka & Steven Penrod, Reinstatement of Context in a Field
Experiment on Eyewitness Identification,49 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 58 (1985)).
217. Id. (citing State v. Cromedy, 158 N.J. 112, 120 (1999)).
218. SOBEL, supra note 8, at 348 (citing Ellis, Davies & Shepherd, Experimental Studies of
Face Identification,3 J.CRiM. DEF. 219, 225-26 (1977)).
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Henderson noted that a "witness may have more difficulty making a crossracial identification."21 9
9.

Private Actors

This estimator variable refers to non-state actors or factors that can
increase the suggestiveness of an identification. Some of the considered
factors "includ[e] whether the witness was exposed to opinions,
descriptions, or identifications given by other witnesses, to photographs or
newspaper accounts, or to any other information or influence that may have
affected the independence of his/her identification." 220 Anytime a witness
speaks to others about what he or she saw or who he or she identified, the
listener's feedback can affect the witness's memory or perceptions of the
accused. This post-identification feedback can have significant effects on a
witness's confidence and later description at trial. Studies show that this
feedback does not have to come from the administrator of the test for it to
affect the witness. The court noted that this "feedback and suggestiveness
can come from co-witnesses and others not connected to the State."22 1
If witnesses read a newspaper article on the accused or speak to each
other about whom they chose, this can "cause a person to form a false
memory of details that he or she never actually observed." 222 This
interaction can also be significant when co-witnesses are acquainted, are
friends, or worse-romantically involved.223 Identifications of witnesses
under these circumstances are "significantly more likely to incorporate
information obtained solely from their co-witness into their own
accounts."224
10. Speed of Identification
Speed of identification relates to how quickly the witness makes an
identification after seeing a lineup/showup/photo array. Some researchers
219. Henderson,208 N.J. at 267 (citing State v. Cromedy, 158 N.J. 112,120-23 (1999)).
220. Id. at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 270.
224. Id. In light of this information, the Henderson court recommended that "police
officers ask witnesses, as part of the identification process, questions designed to elicit (a)
whether the witness has spoken with anyone about the identification and, if so, (b) what was
discussed. That information should be recorded and disclosed to defendants." Id. at 270.
Further, the court admonished law enforcement to instruct witnesses not to speak to each
other concerning the identification. Id. at 271.
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have found that identifications are nearly ninety percent accurate when the
witness identified the target within ten to twelve seconds of seeing a
lineup.225 Other researchers noted that speedy identifications were really
only fifty-nine percent accurate.226 Because of a lack of consensus, the
Henderson court declined to make a recommendation concerning this
variable.
Therefore, with the inaccuracies inherent in eyewitness identification
and the vast number of variables that can affect an identification's accuracy,
it is easy to understand why the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
Perry's seemingly simple case of attempted theft of car speakers. Perry's case
presented the Court with an opportunity to squarely address eyewitness
identification, especially as it relates to due process. The Court, however,
was not up to the task of using the Due Process Clause as a tool for carving
out a special protection for especially fallible evidence like eyewitness
identification.227
V. Is THERE A PROPER STANDARD FOR ADMITTING EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATIONS?

With all that has been presented about eyewitness identification, it is
helpful to set out, on a practical level, what an in-depth analysis of Perry and
eyewitness identification ultimately reveals. First, eyewitness testimony is
inherently unreliable due to the countless variables that can affect an
identification. Second, despite limiting instructions and vigorous crossexamination, juries give an incredible amount of weight to eyewitness
testimony. Furthermore, misidentifications are one of the leading causes of
wrongful convictions-the innocent are going to jail for crimes they are not
committing. Now that the fallibilities inherent in eyewitness identification
have been fully addressed, an overview of possible solutions is in order.
One option is to exclude eyewitness testimony altogether so as to prevent
any chance of further wrongful convictions resulting from
misidentifications. A second option is to admit eyewitness testimony-at
225. Id. (citing David Dunning & Scott Perretta, Automaticity and Eyewitness Accuracy:
A 10- to 12-Second Rule for DistinguishingAccurate from Inaccurate Positive Identifications,
87 J.APPLIED PSYCHOL. 951, 959 (2002)).
226. Id. (citing David F. Ross et al., When Accurate and InaccurateEyewitnesses Look the
Same: A Limitation of the 'Pop-Out' Effect and the 10- to 12-Second Rule, 21 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 677, 688 (2007)). The court noted that this researcher found "twenty-

five seconds to be 'time boundary' between accurate and inaccurate identifications." Id.
227. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2011).
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the judge's discretion-and give the jury detailed, yet understandable,
instructions regarding the inherent unreliability of eyewitness testimony.
This way, the court can set out exactly what juries should consider in
evaluating the eyewitness testimony. Another alternative to consider when
admitting eyewitness identification is to also admit expert testimony to
attest to the issues surrounding eyewitness identifications.
Another option is go to the root of the problem and reform identification
procedures in police departments across the United States. This option
would require a considered effort from state legislatures to research and
identify the best practices that should be implemented and required. Yet
another option is to put more emphasis on equipping defense attorneys to
vigorously advocate for their clients. This option would have law schools as
its foundation. Organizations like the American Bar Association could
require a certain amount of legal education concerning topics of law-like
eyewitness identification-that require extra attention.
Last, an option would be to, in a sense, wash one's hands of the potential
for misidentifications surrounding eyewitness identification and trust that
the procedural and constitutional safeguards already in place will
adequately protect the identified defendant. This option invariably requires
trust in the trial judges who admit or exclude eyewitness testimony. Judges
are left to exercise the discretion granted them in a manner that will serve
two important interests of justice: the defendant will get a fair trial and the
jury will not be deprived of reliable eyewitness testimony.
Before any attempt to apply these potential solutions can be made,
however, it is important to address whether or not the law can or should
change when empirical research demonstrates a need for such legal change.
Although the Court in Perry v. New Hampshire declined to create a brightline solution to the problems related to eyewitness testimony, the case
demonstrates a situation in which a court was presented with a problem
and had to either create a solution to that problem or apply solutions used
in similar, previous circumstances. In order to properly address any need
for a legal rule, a court must first consider the historical principles that have
guided lawmakers for hundreds of years.
A. Evolution of the Law Generally
Ever since the giver of life breathed air into the nostrils of Adam in the
Garden of Eden, there was law.228 Adam was given guidelines on what he
228. Genesis 2:7 (King James Version) (all subsequent citations to Scripture are to the
KJV).
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was to do and how he was to conduct himself.229 Even before Eve's arrival,
the Lord admonished Adam not to eat from the tree of life. 230 This law was
necessary to help Adam and Eve understand God's authority over them.23 1
Since the beginning of mankind, the law has been changing and adapting to
fit the needs of those under it. Usages are transformed into custom, and
custom is eventually transformed into law.2 32
One legal scholar noted that the transformation of custom into law
occurs when restructuring at the top is needed to "control and direct the
slowly changing structure in the middle and at the bottom."233 He goes on to
emphasize that law is "custom transformed, and not merely the will or
reason of the lawmaker. Law spreads upward from the bottom and not only
downward from the top."234 Law is also a means of enforcing the will of the
lawmaker. In terms of natural law, law is an "expression of moral standards
as understood by human reason." 235 Finally, law is "an outgrowth of custom,
a product of the historically rooted values and norms of the community."236
Throughout history, the law surrounding eyewitness testimony has
evolved according to the needs and customs of the day. According to
Mosaic Law, two witnesses were required for conviction of a capital
offense. 237 These witnesses had to be sure enough of their testimony to be
willing to cast the first stone. 23 8 The bystanders then threw the remaining
stones necessary to bring the accused to his death.239 Casting the first stone

229. Adam was to tend the garden, Genesis 2:17, and name every living creature, Genesis
2:19.
230. Genesis 2:17. The penalty for violation of this law was death. Id.
231. Although man was to have dominion over all the Earth, God has ultimate dominion
over all. Genesis 1:26; Daniel 4:34.
232. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 556 (1983).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Deuteronomy 19:15. The Bible repeatedly emphasizes the importance of having
more than one witness. See Matthew 18:16; 2 Corinthians13:1; Hebrews 10:28.
238. Deuteronomy 17:7.
239. Deuteronomy 17:6-7 states,
At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is worthy of
death be put to death; but at the mouth of one witness he shall not be put to
death.
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created a sense of accountability and responsibility for the witnesses.
Additionally, the law specifically forbade a witness from "ris[ing] up against
a man for any iniquity, or for any sin."24 0 Thus, if a witness falsely accused
another man, the witness was brought before the judge, along with the
accused, and given whatever punishment he presumed to impose on the
accused. 241' At this time in history, priests were the sole triers of fact, and
there were no juries.24 2
Further evidence of evolving standards is showcased by the Norman legal
system. Through the Assizes of Ariano, issued in 1140, Roger II developed
the first modern legal code in Western history.24 3 In this code, Roger II
introduced professional judges and an "inquisitional procedure" in which
the judge interrogated witnesses and examined written evidence. 244 Roger
II's successors, in building the Royal Law in Norman Italy, continued Roger
II's innovativeness in developing new procedures.245 This law was
considered a continually developing system that grew over time. 46 It is
noted, "Roger's successors built on the foundations that he had laid,
periodically issuing new laws to meet new circumstances, while maintaining
the basic principles of the system as a whole." 247
This mentality regarding the law has carried throughout history. In
English, Henry II came to the throne in 1154 determined to "replace
anarchy and violence by law and order but also willing to do so through
political and legal institutions and concepts that had only been
foreshadowed by his predecessors in England and Normandy." 248 Henry II
and his advisors followed the old customs as much as possible in light of
new needs and policies.24 9

The hands of the witnesses shall be first upon him to put him to death, and
afterward the hands of all the people. So thou shalt put the evil away from
among you.
240. Deuteronomy 19:15.
241. Deuteronomy 19:15-19.
242. Deuteronomy 19:17.
243. BERMAN, supra note 232, at 419.
244. Id. at 423. These witnesses included witnesses not presented by the parties. Id.
245. Id. at 424.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 442.
249. Id. One of Henry I's major innovations was his formation of permanent central
government departments, including the treasury, the high court, and the chancery. Id. at 443.
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Therefore, it has been a recurrent theme of legal history throughout the
world that, as innovations are made and needs arise, the law must move and
adapt. Harold Berman summarized the early growth of the Western legal
system this way:
Presupposed in the concept of a body of law was the concept of
its growth. Previously, in the periodic legislation of the Germanic
rulers, each great "codification" had been conceived as a general
recapitulation of customary law, superseding those that preceded
it. After the eleventh century, new royal laws presupposed the
continued existence of older ones, and indeed built on them. The
law appeared to expand and develop, as one king added to the
legislation of his predecessors.250
Thus, with an obedient eye toward following general principles, the law can
and should develop. In the law surrounding eyewitness identification, there
has been a great deal of development. As legislatures and courts have
become more aware of the dangers involved in eyewitness testimony, the
law has developed safeguards to protect against misidentifications.
Protections include a unanimous jury verdict requirement, crossexamination, the state's burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,25' and the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.
B. Evolution of the Law GoverningEyewitness Identifications
Even before considering constitutional or procedural safeguards against
misidentification, the analysis must go further back, to the trial judge's
decision on whether or not to admit eyewitness testimony. Essentially, if the
courts and the lawmakers guiding them want to ensure that never again will
a failed eyewitness identification result in a wrongful conviction, eyewitness
testimony must be per se excluded.252 Absent a per se rule, some

250. Id. at 536.
251. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states, "The court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting
time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
252. Certainly this would save taxpayers' money in the time spared in litigating the
admissibility and, if admitted, unreliability of eyewitness identification. It would also spare
defendants the agony of being convicted as a result of the eyewitness testimony and then
facing jail time for crimes they did not commit.
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misidentifications will occur; nevertheless, these select misapplications of
justice do not justify the cost of per se exclusion. The Supreme Court has
recognized the dangers surrounding eyewitness identifications but also
noted that there is an even greater danger that would result if the jury is
deprived of performing its fact-finding function.2 53 Certainly the sword is
double-edged: per se exclusion can let the innocent go back home to his
family, but it can also let the guilty free to offend again.
The judiciary, and presumably the American public, would say that the
juice would not be worth the squeeze if eyewitness testimony, no matter
how accurate, were to be hidden from the jury. Hence, if we determine that
it is too great a sacrifice to exclude eyewitness testimony indefinitely, the
trial court has no way of knowing when to let the witness be heard by the
jury. Despite its subjectivity, our best defense against essentially "bad"
eyewitness testimony is to do two things: (1) advocate for wise, informed
judges to be appointed to the bench; and (2) better educate attorneys
defending against admitted eyewitness testimony.
The American people grant trial judges the discretion to make
admissibility determinations. Such a grant of authority, however, should
not be troubling because admitting eyewitness testimony does not mean
that a conviction against the defendant is guaranteed. Certainly a thoughtful
jury should evaluate the witness's credibility, as well as determine whether
the other evidence at trial supports a conviction. 254 Because juries can
sometimes fail to make the "right" decision, defendants like Perry would
advocate for a special due process inquiry, conducted by the judge, to
determine the reliability of eyewitness testimony. If we were honest,
however, we would ask whether this special due process inquiry is really any
different than what judges are conducting at suppression hearings every
day. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 104,255 trial judges are granted the
discretion to determine the admissibility of evidence.256 That rule
specifically states that, in making admissibility determinations, the judge is

253. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111-12 (1977).
254. Although jurors would not be required to participate (or even be truthful, for that
matter), this author proposes that, in criminal trials where eyewitness testimony is admitted
and the trial results in a conviction, by way of an anonymous questionnaire, the jury should
be asked how much weight each juror gave the eyewitness testimony in making his or her
determination of guilt. This way, researchers could gather information on perceived
eyewitness credibility without having to wait for a wrongful conviction to turn up.
255.

FED. R. EvID. 104(a).

256. Id.
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"not bound by evidence rules[.]" 25 7 The judge can draw from whatever he
needs to draw from to make this determination.
The second part of the defense against unreliable eyewitness testimony is
reforming legal education in such a way as to better equip attorneys to
properly rebut eyewitness testimony. This second part will invariably
support the first because judges, before being appointed or elected to that
position, attend law school and receive the same educational opportunities,
if not more, than regular attorneys. An example of seemingly uninformed
advocacy is evident in Perry. Perry's attorney did not even attempt to
exclude Ullon's testimony, even though Ullon saw Perry as he was standing
with police officers-just as Blandon saw him.258 Additionally, the trial
transcript is riddled with ambiguity that could have been avoided with
clearer questions, leading to clearer responses. For example, three different
witnesses, examined by Perry's counsel, testified that Blandon lived on three
different floors of the apartment building.259 This would have been a good
point to pin down considering its relation to the distance Blandon would
have to look to see Perry.
Moreover, despite the probable benefits of expert testimony, jury
instructions, or better police procedures, any real change in this area must
start with the attorneys practicing in it. A concerned defense counsel should
tirelessly work to inform the judge at the suppression hearing of the
unreliability of the proffered testimony. Then, if the evidence is admitted
anyway, defense counsel must inform the jury of the testimony's
unreliability. In order for attorneys to advocate at a level of excellence-as is
required in any circumstance, but especially in dealing with eyewitness
testimony-law schools, as well as continuing legal education programs,
around the country need to implement curricula to inform students and
practitioners of the problems surrounding eyewitness identification and
teach these students the tools to properly defend against its pitfalls.
If this issue is not improved through zealous advocacy, reform may come
by way of a rule of decision. Although Perry did not provide the requisite
circumstance ripe for reform, the "right" case could come at any time. If it
does, and the Court sees fit to create a more structured rule of decision, this
Note proposes a set of guidelines for formulating a rule of decision. Because
these guidelines are not the rule, but the framework for a potential rule, they
cannot be used to determine the outcome of a dispute. Rather, they should
257. Id.
258. See Joint Appendix, supra note 3, at 48a, 54a-55a.
259. Id. at 43a, 49a, 61a, 66a, 225a-26a.
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be used as factors for the court to consider, in addition to the problems
inherent in eyewitness identifications outlined above, when the court
formulates a rule of decision.
Any rule regarding eyewitness identification should adhere to certain
basic principles-as was the practice in the evolution of the Western legal
system. As identified above, a change in the law should adhere to the
concept of legal integrity, "its ongoingness, its religious roots, [and] its
transcendent qualities[.] "260 Further, the court should consider the necessity

of deterrence, 261 accountability, 262 power in numbers,2 63 protection of

constitutional liberties, 2" and adjudicative efficiency. 265 With these
principles in mind, a court could formulate a rule that is both useful and
faithful to the principles upon which our country was founded.
Nevertheless, until the right case comes along, in light of the fallibility of
man and his inability to truly know truth, it is up to students of the lawboth practicing and otherwise-to stay informed about eyewitness
identification issues. Further, attorneys must develop the skills and
knowledge necessary to properly articulate, for either the judge or the
jury-the fallibility of eyewitness testimony and its susceptibility to error.
Beyond improving practices and techniques-unless eyewitness testimony
is excluded altogether-one principle must be kept in mind: the Lord is the
ultimate judge, and, where our justice system fails, His will not.266

260. BERMAN, supra note 232, at 39.
261. Deterrence not only of police misconduct, but also of criminal activity.
262. This principle is derived from Mosaic law where the witnesses had to cast the first
stone to put the accused to death. Although the law may not require witnesses to participate
in punishing the convicted, perhaps at least informing the witness of the seriousness of the
identification may deter unconsidered identifications.
263. Power in numbers refers to the sensible fact that the more witnesses that saw the
event or person, the easier it will be for the jury (or judge) to measure the credibility of the
testimony. One interesting thing to note is that in Perry there were two eyewitnesses-Ullon
and Blandon. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2012).
264. This includes those liberties expressly outlined in the Constitution, not extensions
therefrom.
265. Efficient adjudication is essential for courts to adequately protect a defendant's right
to a speedy trial.
266. Isaiah 33:22 states, "For the LORD is our judge, the LORD is our lawgiver, the LORD is
our king; he will save us."
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VI. CONCLUSION
If we respect our past, our legal future can be bright. But the lawyers and
judges out there practicing must bring about the legal reform. Although a
bright-line rule could be helpful, the simple fact remains that, unless
eyewitness identification testimony is per se excluded, there will be
misidentifications. Thus, it is up to the practitioners working in criminal
law, as well as the professors and law schools teaching it, to zealously
prepare and be informed about how to protect and defend their clients with
excellence.

